




Evidence for opportunity cost neglect in the poor
Plantinga, A.; Krijnen, J.M.T.; Zeelenberg, M.; Breugelmans, S.M.
Published in:






Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Plantinga, A., Krijnen, J. M. T., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2018). Evidence for opportunity cost
neglect in the poor. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 31(1), 65-73. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2041
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Evidence for Opportunity Cost Neglect in the Poor
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ABSTRACT
People often neglect opportunity costs: They do not fully take into account forgone alternatives outside of a particular choice set. Several
scholars have suggested that poor people should be more likely to spontaneously consider opportunity costs, because budget constraints
should lead to an increased focus on trade-offs. We did not find support for this hypothesis in five high-powered experiments (total
N = 2325). The experiments used different products (both material and experiential) with both high and low prices (from $8.50 to $249.99)
and different methods of reminding participants of opportunity costs. High-income and low-income participants showed an equally strong
decrease in willingness to buy when reminded of opportunity costs, implying that both the rich and the poor neglect opportunity costs. ©
2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the supporting information tab for this article.
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Do the poor and the rich make financial decisions differently?
Several studies show that they do. For example, the poor
have been reported to discount the future more strongly
(Green et al., 1996; Lawrance, 1991) and to be more risk
averse (Dohmen et al., 2011). An important related question
is whether the financial behavior displayed by the poor
further contributes to a suboptimal financial position, leading
to a vicious cycle of poverty (a poverty trap; Azariadis &
Stachurski, 2005). Some research does suggest that this is
the case; poverty was found to be related to decreases in
cognitive functioning (Mani et al., 2013) and self-control
(Spears, 2011). However, there is also research suggesting
that poverty can increase decision quality: The poor seem
to be less susceptible to context effects and better able to
judge the value of money (Shah et al., 2012). For example,
in studies on the classic jacket and calculator problem,
participants are usually willing to travel to a different store
for a discount on a cheap product, but not for the same
absolute discount on an expensive product (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). However, in Shah et al., participants with
lower incomes were not influenced by the price of the
product, showing that they were less influenced by the
decision context. Other studies find no differences between
poor and rich in financial decision making. For example,
Carvalho, Meier, and Wang (2016) found no differences in
performance on cognitive tasks, heuristic judgements, or
the consistency of intertemporal and risky choices between
before-payday and after-payday groups. Bertrand,
Mullainathan, and Shafir (2006, p. 8) argue that “the poor
may exhibit basic weaknesses and biases that are similar to
those of people from other walks of life, except that in
poverty, there are narrow margins for error, and the same
behaviors often manifest themselves in more pronounced
ways and can lead to worse outcomes.” Taken together, these
different findings strongly suggest that ideas about
differences in financial decision making between the poor
and the rich should not be taken at face value, but rather be
empirically tested. In the current paper, we present five
experiments testing whether poor and rich people differ in
how they deal with opportunity costs.
Several scholars have predicted that the poor are less
likely to suffer from opportunity cost neglect—failing to
consider alternatives outside of a choice set which may result
in suboptimal choices (Frederick et al., 2009; Jones et al.,
1998; Legrenzi et al., 1993; Northcraft, 1986). In the words
of Thaler (2015): “the one group of people that come closest
to thinking this way [i.e. as described by normative theory]
about opportunity costs is the poor [...] simply because
opportunity costs are highly salient for them” (p. 58).
Thinking about opportunity costs is important because
money can only be spent once. The decision whether to
buy something should not be based solely on a good’s
attributes, but also on potential alternative uses of people’s
money. Furthermore, opportunity costs should be especially
important for the poor because their budget constraints leave
only narrow margins of error (Bertrand et al., 2006); the
same mistake can have more relative financial impact for
the poor than for the rich. Thus, there are good reasons to
believe that the poor should show opportunity cost neglect
to a lesser extent.
To our knowledge, this idea that poor people are less sus-
ceptible to opportunity cost neglect has not yet been tested
empirically. We report a series of five (quasi-)experiments
that examine whether the poor and the rich differ in how they
deal with opportunity costs. In our studies, we tried to stay as
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close as possible to existing research on both opportunity
cost neglect and research on the effects of poverty on
decision making, in order to ensure comparability of our
findings with the published research. The studies that we
conducted used an established paradigm (Frederick et al.,
2009) and a population previously used in research
comparing the decisions of the poor and the rich (e.g., Callan
et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2015).
In contrast to what was predicted, we find that reminding
participants with low incomes of opportunity costs strongly
decreases willingness to buy, implying that they neglect
opportunity costs when they are not reminded (cf. Frederick
et al., 2009). This effect is equally strong for participants
with low incomes compared with participants with higher
incomes. Furthermore, the effect is robust across measures
of poverty; it is found using both objective and subjective
measures of poverty. These results suggest a simple and
parsimonious account of consideration of opportunity costs:
Both the rich and the poor show opportunity cost neglect.
Before discussing the studies and results in detail, we first
explain what opportunity costs are, why they are often
neglected, and why scholars have predicted that the poor
should be less susceptible to opportunity cost neglect.
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
Opportunity costs reflect the potential benefits of the best
non-chosen option. For example, when buying a movie ticket
for $8.50, that same $8.50 cannot be used for other
purchases. In this case, the opportunity costs reflect the best
alternative use of the $8.50, which could be a different
product or service, but could also be simply keeping the
money for later. In neoclassical economics, consumers are as-
sumed to take opportunity costs into account when evaluating
a potential purchase, requiring them to consider all possible
options. Experimental research, however, suggests that
people often fail to fully take into account non-presented
alternatives, resulting in opportunity cost neglect (Frederick
et al., 2009; Jones et al., 1998).
Frederick et al. (2009) found that reminding participants
of opportunity costs led to a lower willingness to buy a
particular product, which implies that participants neglected
opportunity costs unless these were explicitly pointed out.
For example, when choosing between a cheaper and more
expensive coffee mug, participants were less likely to
purchase the more expensive mug when the description of
the cheaper mug included the phrase “leaving you with an
extra $6.01 in cash to spend on something else” (Frederick
et al., 2009, p. 556). Frederick et al. argue that people focus
on explicit and salient information (i.e. the opportunity under
consideration) and tend to ignore implicitly presented infor-
mation (i.e. the non-presented options: opportunity costs).
The importance of considering opportunity costs was further
demonstrated by Bartels and Urminsky (2015). They found
that valuing future outcomes highly is only related to
decreased spending when people consider opportunity costs.
In their experiments, participants who felt highly connected
to their future selves or discounted the future weakly spent
less only when they were reminded of opportunity costs.
Other studies provide direct or indirect evidence for the
existence of opportunity cost neglect. For example, Jones
et al. (1998) found that the same decision is made differently
when framed as an opportunity (“Should I move to New
York?”) compared with when it is framed as a choice
(“Should I move to New York or stay in Chicago?”). Specif-
ically, given that an option is perceived as at least mildly
attractive, people are more likely to pursue it when it is pre-
sented as an opportunity instead of as a choice. Because peo-
ple change their decisions when the option not to move is
made explicit, these results support the idea that people tend
to neglect opportunity costs. Other evidence comes from the
observation that people tend to ignore the hidden zero in inter-
personal and intertemporal choice (Handgraaf et al., 2003;
Magen et al., 2008). When it was made explicit that choosing
a smaller, sooner option meant that participants would receive
$0 later and that choosing a larger, later option meant that they
would receive $0 now, participants were more likely to
choose the larger, later option. Again, participants’ choices
were influenced by reminders of opportunity costs, in this
case making them more patient. More recent research has
shown that this effect is driven specifically by reminding
participants of the future consequences—receiving $0 later
(Read et al., 2016). Together, this research suggests that
people tend to focus on information that is described and tend
to neglect information that is not described. Because in
practice opportunity costs are typically left implicit, they are
often neglected.
OPPORTUNITY COST NEGLECT IN THE POOR
People may be especially likely to ignore implicit alternatives
when the decision involves low-cost products and when deci-
sion makers have considerable “slack” in their budgets
(Zauberman&Lynch, 2005). In other words, when the impact
of the trade-offs that have to be made is limited, people are
more likely to ignore opportunity costs. By the same reason-
ing, when trade-offs are significant (i.e. when the decision
involves high-cost products or the decision-maker’s budget
lacks slack), people should weigh opportunity costs more
heavily in their decisions. In those situations, we should
observe less pronounced opportunity cost neglect. In the
words of Frederick et al. (2009, p. 559): “very poor individ-
uals or those on fixed incomes may be keenly aware of oppor-
tunity costs in many decisions because their binding budget
constraints may frequently necessitate a careful comparison
of mutually exclusive options.” The idea that the poor may
be less susceptible to opportunity cost neglect fits with a
broader perspective on poverty forwarded by Mullainathan
and Shafir (2013), which posits that resource scarcity pro-
motes trade-off thinking: Pressing needs make trade-offs
(and therefore opportunity costs) highly accessible.
Diminished sensitivity to opportunity cost neglect among
the poor has not yet been directly studied, even though it fits
closely with research showing that the poor are less suscepti-
ble to classic context effects (Shah et al., 2015). For example,
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Shah et al. presented participants with Thaler’s (1985) classi-
cal beer-on-the-beach scenario, where participants are asked
to name their maximum willingness to pay for a beer that
would be consumed on the beach, but would be bought in
either a fancy resort or a run-down grocery store. Poorer
participants more often mentioned trade-offs as the main
consideration in their decision, and their willingness to pay
was not influenced by where the beer was bought.
In research strongly related to the current studies, Spiller
(2011) found that participants were more likely to consider
opportunity costs when they were made to feel budget
constrained by being paid in short pay cycles. Participants
encountered a sequence of products of which they could
buy some but not all and had the option to consider products
available in the future (i.e. they could consider opportunity
costs). Those on a “weekly” instead of “monthly” pay
cycle—those who faced more constraint—were more likely
to look ahead. Finally, Fernbach, Kan, and Lynch (2015)
found that budget constraint made people more likely to
use priority planning instead of efficiency planning. As
priority planning involves explicit consideration of opportu-
nity costs, this provides additional evidence for the effect of
feeling financial constraint on considering opportunity costs.
In sum, researchers have forwarded both theoretical and
empirical reasons to expect that poor people are less suscep-
tible to opportunity cost neglect. In research studying the
situational effects of inducing scarcity (e.g., Spiller, 2011),
participants who were manipulated to feel more budget
constrained weighted opportunity costs more heavily. How-
ever, the claim that people who are structurally poor are more
likely to spontaneously consider opportunity costs has not
yet been tested. Being poor often involves experiencing scar-
city, but it is nonetheless important to distinguish the effects
of situational scarcity from the effects of structural poverty.
People in poverty do not always experience budget con-
straint, and poverty has many other effects besides budget
constraint. The finding that budget constraint reduces oppor-
tunity cost neglect does therefore not imply that people in
poverty neglect opportunity costs to a lesser extent.
CURRENT RESEARCH
We tested whether people with low incomes show opportu-
nity cost neglect to a lesser extent than people with higher in-
comes. In all experiments, participants in the control
condition were simply asked to make a choice, whereas par-
ticipants in the experimental condition made the same choice
after being reminded of opportunity costs. It is important to
note for our present focus on decision making by the poor
that previous experiments using similar manipulations
mostly used student samples (Frederick et al., 2009; Jones
et al., 1998), which tend to be from a more privileged back-
ground than the average population (e.g., Henrich et al.,
2010). For this reason, we expected to replicate Frederick
et al.’s findings that reminding of opportunity costs leads to
lower willingness to buy for the richer participants. However,
if the poor indeed spontaneously consider opportunity costs,
the poorer participants should not be influenced by this
manipulation to the same extent. Thus, we hypothesized that
reminding participants of opportunity costs causes a decrease
in willingness to buy for the rich but not (or to a lesser extent)
for the poor.
Before we turn to the experiments, we would like to note
that there are many definitions of poverty. To make sure we
do not miss the effect of a particular type of poverty, we test
our hypotheses using multiple poverty measures. First, we
use effective income, calculated by dividing recoded house-
hold income by the square root of the number of people in
the household (cf. Buhmann & Rainwater, 1988). Second,
we test for differences between people below and above the
US Federal Poverty Guideline (Office of the Secretary,
2015) and people in the lowest income quintile versus those
in other quintiles. Finally, we use two subjective measures in
which we ask people to rate their own financial situation and
subjective social status (subjective wealth and theMacArthur
ladder). Thus, we will examine whether opportunity cost
neglect is moderated by effective income, by living below
the poverty line, by being in the first income quintile, and
by subjective wealth and subjective social status.
EXPERIMENTS
All experiments used a similar paradigm: Participants read a
scenario about encountering an attractive product and were
asked whether they would buy the product. We varied be-
tween participants whether they were reminded of opportu-
nity costs before making the decision or not. Experiments
1–4 used the same manipulation as Frederick et al.’s (2009)
study 1: The non-buying option was phrased as “not buying
the product” in the control conditions and as “keeping the
money for other purchases” in the experimental conditions.
In experiment 5, one group of participants was asked to list
what other things they would be able to buy if they would
not buy the product (in this case a tablet); another group
was asked to list what they would not be able to buy if they
would buy the product, and the control group simply made
the decision to buy the product or not (similar to Jones
et al., 1998). Because the results did not differ significantly
between the two experimental conditions, they are discussed
together (data on all conditions is available online). In order
to examine the influence of the price of the product and the
nature of the product (material or experiential; Van Boven
& Gilovich, 2003), we used four different products (DVD,
tablet, movie ticket, and concert ticket, refer to Table 1). To
further test the idea that the poor are more likely to spontane-
ously consider opportunity costs, after making the buying de-
cision in experiments 3 and 4, participants were asked to list
alternative things they would do with the money. In experi-
ments 3–5, participants also rated how difficult it was to
come up with alternatives (except for participants in the con-
trol condition of experiment 5). After the scenario, we asked
for income and other demographic information.
In all five experiments, we hypothesized an interaction ef-
fect between condition and income: The effect of reminding
participants of opportunity costs should be smaller for
participants with lower incomes than for those with higher
Opportunity Cost Neglect in the PoorA. Plantinga et al.
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lower incomes think that it is easier to come up with alterna-




US participants were recruited online (total N = 2438, 54.1%
male, Mage = 31.12, SDage = 13.03) via Amazon’s Mechani-
cal Turk (MTurk, refer to Buhrmester et al., 2011; Paolacci
& Chandler, 2014), limited to people who had not partici-
pated in one of the previous experiments. For the first exper-
iment, sample size was based on Shah et al.’s (2015) study
1B, who found an interaction effect between condition and
socioeconomic status on willingness to pay at ηp2 = 0.0315.
A power analysis (with α = 0.05, 1  β = 0.80) indicated that
a minimum of 244 participants would be needed to detect
this effect size. For experiments 2–5, we determined the
number of participants using similar power analyses based
on effect sizes from the previous experiments (N1 = 320,
N2 = 328, N3 = 642, N4 = 637, and N5 = 511).
To examine whether the poor and rich differ in their deci-
sions, heterogeneity with respect to income is necessary. In
our samples, there was substantial variation in the household
income of the participants, although income was in general
lower than the average of the US population (DeNavas-Walt
& Proctor, 2015). In terms of household income, across the
five experiments, 31.90% of the participants were in the low-
est income quintile of the US population, and 25.05, 23.98,
14.16, and 4.91% were in the second, third, fourth, and fifth
quintiles, respectively. Approximately 15.44% of the sample
fell below the US Federal Poverty Guideline (Office of the
Secretary, 2015).
Procedure
In all experiments, participants were presented with a
scenario describing an attractive product (adapted from
Frederick et al., 2009). For example, experiment 1 used the
following scenario:
Imagine that on your most recent visit to the video store you
come across a special sale on a new DVD. This DVD is one with
your favorite actor or actress, and your favorite type of movie
(such as a comedy, drama, thriller, etc.). This particular video
that you are considering is one you have been thinking about
buying a long time. It is available at a special sale price of
$14.99.
Experiments 2–5 used different products (a tablet for
$249.99, a movie ticket for $8.50, and a concert ticket for
$50.00) with a similar description (refer to Table 1 for an
overview of the setup and results of all experiments and Sup-
plement A for all scenarios). Next, participants in the control
condition were asked whether they would buy the product or
not. Participants in the opportunity cost condition in experi-
ments 1–4 were asked whether they would buy the product
or keep the $X for other purchases. In experiment 5, partici-
pants in the opportunity cost conditions were first asked (1)
what other things they would buy with the $249.99 if they
would not buy the tablet or (2) what other things they would
not be able to buy, if they bought the tablet for $249.99.
Then, they were asked whether they would buy or not buy
the tablet. Participants in the control condition were simply
asked whether they would buy the tablet. In experiments 3
and 4, after making the buying decision, participants were
asked to list other things they would consider doing with
the money instead of buying the product. We also measured
the time it took them to come up with the alternatives. In ex-
periments 3–5, participants were asked how hard they
thought it was to come up with alternatives, on a scale of 1
(very easy) to 7 (very hard).
Finally, participants were asked their household’s income,
the number of persons in their household, and their education
level, gender, and age. Household income was asked in in-
come brackets of $10,000, with a highest category of
$150,000 and above. For the analyses, income was recoded
following Ravallion (1992): Income was estimated as the
midpoint of each income bracket, except for the lowest
bracket (80% of the upper bound) and the highest income
bracket (130% of the lower bound). We also asked partici-
pants to position themselves on the MacArthur ladder
(Adler & Stewart, 2007), a measure of perceived relative
social status, and to rate three subjective wealth items
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, χ2 tests, and logistic regressions for experiments 1–5
Descriptive statistics χ2 test condition Logistic regressions








cost condition) χ2 p
Condition
(0 = control,







1 320 DVD $14.99 43.83% 37.97% 0.904 .342 0.24 (0.23) 0.08 (0.08) 0.19 (0.10)
2 328 Tablet $249.99 62.28% 53.42% 2.289 .130 0.40 (0.23) 0.05 (0.06) 0.26 (0.10)**
3 642 Movie ticket $8.50 71.97% 55.18% 18.775 <.001 0.82 (0.18)*** 0.12 (0.06) 0.12 (0.08)
4 637 Concert ticket $50.00 60.06% 49.69% 6.502 .011 0.45 (0.17)** 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.07)
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measuring perceived personal financial situation (on scales of
1–7 with different anchors, e.g., “How would you describe
your current financial situation?”; Gasiorowska, 2014).
Results
Approach to the analyses
For each experiment, we ran a logistic regression with buy-
ing decision as dependent variable and condition, centered
effective income, and their interaction as predictors. In all
analyses, condition was recoded to a dummy variable
(0 = control, 1 = opportunity cost reminder). The results
for each experiment are summarized in Table 1 and
described in the next sections. Before testing the hypothe-
sized interaction effects, we tested for effects of reminding
of opportunity costs and income on choice; we found
evidence for both these main effects. In order to test the
hypotheses across the five experiments, we also report
several meta-analyses, which all use random-effects models
in the metafor package 1.9–9 with R 3.3.3 (R Core Team,
2016; Viechtbauer, 2010). The results of the meta-analyses
are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Effect of condition
In all experiments, the proportion of participants indicating
that they would buy the product was lower in the opportunity
cost condition than in the control condition (the difference
ranged from 5.8 to 16.8 percentage points), but this
difference was significant only in experiments 3–5 (Table 1).
When controlling for effective income and the interaction
effect in a logistic regression, willingness to buy was still
lower in the opportunity cost condition across all experi-
ments (and statistically significant in experiments 3–5). In a
meta-analysis across the five experiments (Figure 1), the
effect of condition after controlling for effective income
and the interaction effect was significant and substantial,
OR = 0.54, z = 3.81, p < .001, 95% CI [0.39, 0.74] (test
for heterogeneity: Q(4) = 13.25, p = .010). On average, in
the control conditions, 62.8% of the participants indicated
buying the product, whereas only 47.8% did so in the oppor-
tunity cost conditions. In sum, we find strong evidence for
opportunity cost neglect across our experiments, replicating
Frederick et al. (2009).
Effects of income and subjective wealth
In all experiments, effective income was positively related to
willingness to buy, but this correlation was only statistically
significant in experiment 5 (it ranged from r(315) = .04,
p = .511, 95% CI [.07, .15] in experiment 1 to
r(499) = .14, p = .002, 95% CI [.05, .22] in experiment 5).
A meta-analysis of the correlations between effective income
and buying decision shows a small but statistically significant
correlation, r = .07, z = 3.59, p = <.001, 95% CI [.03, .11]
(Q(4) = 2.82, p = .588). In another meta-analysis, subjective
wealth was also positively related to buying decision, r = .13,
z = 6.41, p < .001, 95% CI [.09, .17] (Q(4) = 2.99, p = .560).
Interaction condition and income
Contrary to the hypothesis that the poor show opportunity cost
neglect to a lesser extent than the rich, none of the studies
showed a statistically significant negative interaction effect
between effective income and condition (Table 1).
Experiment 2 even found a significant positive interaction
effect, b = 0.26, t(317) = 2.62, p = .009, meaning that
reminding participants of opportunity costs led to a greater de-
crease in willingness to buy for participants with lower
incomes than for participants with higher incomes, which is
opposite to what was predicted. In a meta-analysis, we also
Figure 1. Forest plot for the meta-analysis of the effect of condition
(control vs. opportunity cost reminder) on buying decision after
controlling for effective income and an interaction effect between
condition and effective income for experiments 1–5. An odds ratio
smaller than 1 means that participants were less likely to buy the
product when the opportunity cost reminder was present than when
it was not present
Figure 2. Forest plot for the meta-analysis of the interaction effect
of condition (control vs. opportunity cost reminder) and income
on buying decision, after controlling for the main effects of con-
dition and income for experiments 1–5. The coefficients represent
differences in log(odds ratio). A positive interaction effect means
that the effect of the opportunity cost reminder was larger for
participants with lower incomes
Opportunity Cost Neglect in the PoorA. Plantinga et al.
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found no significant interaction effect between condition and
effective income, b = 0.08, z = 1.22, p = .222, 95% CI
[0.05, 0.21] (Q(4) = 11.03, p = .026; effective income in
$10,000, refer to Figure 2). The natural logarithm of this
coefficient, ln(b) = 1.08, 95%CI [0.95, 1.23]) indicates the ra-
tio of the odds ratios in the sample for the different conditions.
The lower bound of its 95% confidence interval is close to 1,
which means that the data suggest that even if a negative inter-
action effect exists, it would be small. Furthermore, the data
showmore support for a positive interaction effect; in the sam-
ple, the effect of opportunity costs was bigger (more negative)
for participants with lower incomes.
As a robustness check, we also tested whether the effect of
condition on buying decision was moderated by any of the
other wealth measures. In logistic regressions with
subjective wealth instead of effective income, none of the in-
teraction effects were statistically significant (p-values ranged
from .139 to .724). A meta-analysis on these interaction ef-
fects also showed no significant effect, b = 0.11, z = 1.38,
p = .169, 95% CI [0.04, 0.26] (Q(4) = 5.23, p = .264). Sim-
ilarly, using the MacArthur ladder in a similar meta-analysis
also yielded no significant interaction effect, b = 0.05,
z = 0.64, p = .522, 95% CI [0.11, 0.21] (Q(4) = 9.62,
p = .047), as did meta-analyses using five effective income
brackets (i.e. equally sized groups of participants divided by
effective income), b = 0.09, z = 0.79, p = .431, 95% CI
[0.13, 0.31] (Q(4) = 12.35, p = .015) or analyses that divided
participants into those in the first income bracket versus other
income brackets, b = 0.18, z = 0.78, p = .434, 95% CI [0.27,
0.62] (Q(4) = 5.46, p = .243), first income quintile versus other
quintiles, b = 0.41, z = 1.85, p = .064, 95% CI [0.02, 0.84]
(Q(4) = 5.39, p = .250), or below the poverty line versus above
the poverty line, b = 0.05, z = 0.19, p = .848, 95% CI [0.43,
0.53] (Q(4) = 4.95, p = .293).
Because there was significant heterogeneity in the effect
size of the interaction effect between condition and effective
income on buying decision, we conducted some exploratory
analyses to test whether the size of this effect was moderated
by any study-level moderators (Supplement B). The effect
was not significantly moderated by the price of the product
nor the manipulation used. However, the interaction effect
was significantly more positive for material than for experi-
ential products. Furthermore, a meta-analysis on only the ex-
periments with material products found a significant positive
interaction effect. This means that, for material products, the
effect of reminding of opportunity costs was stronger (more
negative) for the poor than for the rich. Note that this effect
is opposite to that we had hypothesized.
In sum, these results do not support the prediction that the
poor show less or no opportunity cost neglect. Overall, the
data indicate that the poor are as likely as the rich to fail to take
opportunity costs into account. If anything, our exploratory
analyses indicate that under some conditions, the poor may
be more likely than the rich to show opportunity cost neglect.
Generating alternatives
If the poor are more likely to spontaneously consider oppor-
tunity costs, they should find it easier to generate alternative
uses of the money. To test that, participants in experiments
3–5 were asked to list alternative ways to use the money.
Participants with lower incomes reported that they found it
easier to come up with alternatives, although the correlation
between effective income and perceived difficulty was only
statistically significant in experiment 3, r(594) = .09,
p = .035, 95% CI [.01, .17]. In a meta-analysis across the
three experiments, the correlation was small but statistically
significant, r = .07, z = 2.93, p = .003, 95% CI [.02, .12]
(Q(2) = 0.32, p = .851).
The number of generated alternatives correlated positively
with income in experiment 4, r(582) = .11, p = .006, 95% CI
[.03, .19] and non-significantly in experiment 3, r(594) = .05,
p = .244, 95% CI [.03, .13], and experiment 5, r(499) = .07,
p = .120, 95% CI [.02, .16]. A meta-analysis on these cor-
relations showed a small but significant positive correlation
between effective income and the number of alternatives
generated, r = .08, z = 3.33, p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .12]
(Q(2) = 1.50, p = .472). After controlling for the number of
alternatives generated, there was no statistically significant
effect of effective income on time spent per generated alter-
native in any of experiments 3–5 (p values ranged from
.313 to .928), nor in a meta-analysis across the three experi-
ments, OR = 0.74, z = 1.03, p = .302, 95% CI [0.41, 1.32]
(Q(2) = 0.70, p = .706).1
In sum, there is no clear evidence that alternatives come
more easily to mind for participants with lower incomes.
We find some evidence that people with lower incomes
find it easier to come up wither alternative uses of their
money. However, people with lower incomes generated
fewer alternatives than participants with higher incomes.
We found no differences in the time spent per generated
alternative, after controlling for the number of generated
alternatives.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across five experiments, we replicate the finding by
Frederick et al. (2009) that reminding people of opportunity
costs decreases willingness to buy. However, this effect
was equally strong for participants with low and high
incomes: Both showed a decrease in willingness to buy in
response to the reminder. In other words, we found no
evidence for an interaction effect between income and condi-
tion: Both the rich and the poor showed opportunity cost
neglect.
These findings contribute additional evidence for the
robustness of opportunity cost neglect as described by
Frederick et al. (2009). People appear to fail to fully consider
opportunity costs in buying decisions. The findings contra-
dict the idea, proposed by several authors (Frederick et al.,
2009; Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013; Shah et al., 2015;
Spiller, 2011), that opportunity costs are more salient for
1As described in the Supporting Information, we also coded the alternatives
on whether they were material versus experiential products and necessities
versus luxurious products. We found no effect of income on listing material
versus experiential products. Participants with higher incomes were some-
what more likely to list luxurious products rather than necessities compared
with participants with lower incomes.
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the poor. Although previous research did find an effect of
budget constraint on opportunity cost consideration (Spiller,
2011), we did not find evidence of a similar effect of poverty.
This may imply that the poor do not continuously experience
resource scarcity, even though they may be more likely to
encounter situations of scarcity. Our data suggest that people
only think about opportunity costs when they are relevant or
salient.
One potential alternative explanation for our findings
could be that the poorest participants in our studies were
not poor enough. We do not consider this a viable explana-
tion. In line with previous work on MTurk samples
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), our
samples display substantial variation in income. On average,
about 15.44% of the participants in our experiments lived
below the US Federal Poverty Guideline (Office of the
Secretary, 2015). This is corroborated by the fact that both
effective income and subjective wealth did affect willingness
to buy in a meta-analysis across the experiments, suggesting
at least a substantial amount of variance in income. Further-
more, studies by Shah et al. (2015) used MTurk samples in
similar paradigms and did find interaction effects between
experimental condition and income on financial decisions.
Therefore, we do not think that our findings can be explained
by inadequate sampling. Of course, we cannot fully exclude
the possibility that people living in extreme poverty would
not show opportunity cost neglect. However, even if this
were true, this would confine the idea that opportunity costs
are more salient for the poor to a very small subsample of the
total population of people generally seen as “poor” in studies
of poverty and decision making.
We tested only a restricted set of poverty measures and
products. For instance, we did not include a measure of
childhood socioeconomic status, which only modestly corre-
lates with current socioeconomic status but also impacts fi-
nancial decisions made later in life (Griskevicius et al.,
2013).2 Future research could test whether growing up in a
budget-constrained environment leads to less opportunity
cost neglect later in life. We also only used scenarios with
hedonic, as opposed to utilitarian, products. We chose these
products because opportunity costs should be higher for he-
donic than for utilitarian products. When thinking about
whether or not to buy a movie ticket, it is more likely that
there are useful alternative uses of the money than when
thinking about spending money on groceries. Especially for
people with low incomes, opportunity costs should be more
pressing and therefore come to mind more easily for hedonic
goods. Therefore, we feel that this is the strongest test of the
hypothesis.
It is also possible that the hypothesized difference was not
found because participants did not think deeply about their
decision, because the decisions were hypothetical. Again,
we do not think this to be a likely explanation, because it is
hard to reconcile with the effects of income on hypotheti-
cal choices in studies by Shah et al. (2015). In addition,
this explanation has trouble explaining why willingness to
buy would be influenced by effective income (although
this effect was small) and by reminding of opportunity
costs. If participants are not thinking deeply or not paying
attention, their decisions should not be influenced by any
of these variables. Finally, Frederick et al. (2009) repli-
cated the effect of reminding of opportunity costs on will-
ingness to buy in a study using consequential choices,
suggesting that people behave similarly when the choices
are consequential.
Another alternative explanation is that the reminder of
opportunity costs had no effect on most of the poor partici-
pants, but a strong effect on some. In other words, whereas
most poor participants were already considering opportunity
costs, the reminder was particularly effective for the minority
who were not. Under the assumption that people who spon-
taneously consider opportunity costs find it easier to generate
alternative uses for their money, we can test this explanation
by examining whether there is a three-way interaction
between condition, income, and reported difficulty of gener-
ating alternatives: The effect of the opportunity cost reminder
should interact with the difficulty variable for people with
low incomes, but not for those with high incomes. We do
not find such an effect in experiments 3 and 4 (p values
>.230), nor in a meta-analysis across the two studies,
b = 0.03, z = 0.94, p = .347, 95% CI [0.04, 0.10]
(Q(1) = 0.57, p = .451).
A further possibility is that the poor are more likely to
think about opportunity costs, but not more likely to act on
them. The opportunity cost reminder might exert more nor-
mative pressure for participants with lower incomes than
for participants with higher incomes. However, we think that
this is a less parsimonious explanation of our data, and we
have no reason to believe that for lower income individuals,
the link between cognition and behavior is weaker. Further-
more, we think that it is unlikely that the fairly subtle re-
minder of opportunity costs exerts a strong normative
pressure.
Finally, it is possible that a third variable, intelligence, has
an effect on both income and the consideration of opportu-
nity costs, negating the effect of income. However, even if
intelligence was to affect both income and opportunity cost
neglect, our data would still contradict the claim that the poor
are more likely to think about opportunity costs. Further-
more, we do not find strong evidence of an effect of educa-
tion in our studies; a meta-analysis of the effect of
condition and education and their interaction on buying deci-
sion showed no significant interaction effect, OR = 1.13,
z = 1.91, p = .056, 95% CI [1.00, 1.27] (Q(4) = 4.78,
p = .311). When education was added to the meta-analysis
of the effect of condition, effective income, and their interac-
tion on buying decision, the interaction effect was still not
significant, OR = 1.08, z = 1.25, p = .211, 95% CI [0.96,
1.23] (Q(4) = 10.62, p = .031).
Our findings propose a number of suggestions for future
studies and policy. First, the difference between our findings
and those by Spiller (2011), who found that opportunity cost
neglect was affected by budget constraint, raises questions
about the different effects of structural poverty and
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative
explanation.
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situational budget constraint on financial decision making.
Studies on poverty and decision making typically make use
of either quasi-experimental designs using existing groups
of people who live under different conditions or of experi-
mental designs using situational inductions of scarcity. Our
findings and those by Spiller suggest that the results obtained
with one design do not necessarily generalize to other de-
signs. It would be interesting to see whether similar differ-
ences occur with other dependent variables studied in a
context of scarcity or poverty. For example, the poor are less
likely to be affected by a decision’s context (Shah et al.,
2015), but does experiencing scarcity also reduce the impact
of context? Second, our exploratory analyses suggest that
there might be a difference between material products and ex-
periences: We found that the opportunity cost reminder had a
stronger effect on low-income individuals than high-income
individuals for material but not for experiential products. Pre-
vious research found that facing financial constraints in-
creases interest in material over experiential products (Tully
et al., 2015). Possibly, this change in preferences is associated
with more opportunity cost neglect for material products.
Third, the replication of findings by Frederick et al. (2009)
in a socioeconomically diverse sample suggests that a simple
reminder of opportunity costs might be a useful way to help
both poor and rich consumers make choices that are more in
line with their long-term goals. Finally, the finding of evi-
dence for opportunity cost neglect in the poor may mean that
more attention should be paid to this factor when trying to al-
leviate poverty. After all, neglecting opportunity costs might
have more harmful consequences for the poor because of their
narrow margins of error (Bertrand et al., 2006).
To conclude, our data suggests that poor and rich alike are
susceptible to opportunity cost neglect. Opportunity costs do
not seem to be on the top of the minds of people, regardless
of their income. These findings are unlikely to be explained
by sampling, methodology, or unobserved variables. Thus,
the most parsimonious interpretation is that opportunity cost
neglect is a robust and general phenomenon.
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